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only	 about	 two	 thirds	 of	 all	 policies	 they	 adopt?	 This	 paper	 argues	 	 that	
empty	 promises	 are	 an	 important	 reason	 for	 Mercosur’s	 incorporation	





sur’s	members	 can	easily	 veto	 any	agreement	ex-post.	 In	 addition	 to	empty	
promises,	 mismanaged	 drafting	 and	 incorporation,	 and	 the	 abuse	 of	 nego-	
tiation	 power	 also	 pose	 important	 obstacles	 to	 incorporation.	 Free-riding,	
however,	does	not	play	a	role.	Due	to	the	incorporation	rules,	there	can	be	no	
externalities	that	incentivise	unilateral	defection.	The	paper	substantiates	the	
arguments	 empirically	 with	 the	 multivariate	 analysis	 of	 the	 complete	
incorporation	record	of	1033	policies	adopted	between	1994	and	2008.	
	











The	 member	 countries	 of	 the	 world’s	 fourth	 trading	 block	 do	 not	 keep	 all	 of	 their	
promises.	 Ever	 since	 Argentina,	 Brazil,	 Paraguay	 and	 Uruguay	 founded	 Mercosur	 in	




Various	 scholars	 advance	 explanations.	 Bureaucratic	 or	 legal	 inefficiencies	 at	 the	in-	
ternational1		or	the	domestic	level2		are	important	impediments	to	incorporation.	 Others	
spotlight	 preference	 related	 issues.	 Power	 asymmetries	 between	 member	 countries	
(Eichengreen	and	Frankel	1995;	Malamud	2011;	Spektor	2010),	Mercosur’s	formal	rules	
for	incorporation	(Bouzas	 et	 al.	2008)	or	weak	enforcement	mechanisms3	 represent	
important	obstacles.	But	why	should	governments	sign	policies	already	knowing	that	they	













                                                        
1 See Bouzas and Soltz (2001b); Bouzas, Gratius, Soltz and Sberro (2008); Geneyro 
(2003); Peña (2003); Pena and Rozemberg (2005); Perotti, Stark, Vaillant and 
Ventura (2004); Ventura and Perotti (2004); Zalduendo (1998). 
2 See Bergamaschine Mata Diz (2005); Bouzas et al. (2008); Caetano and Perina 
(2003); Geneyro (2003); Nascimento (2004); Pena and Rozemberg (2005); Perotti, 
Stark, Vaillant and Ventura (2005) 
3 See Bouzas and Soltz (2001b); Bouzas et al. (2008); Geneyro (2003); Pena and 
Rozemberg (2005); Ventura and Perotti (2004); Zalduendo (1998). 
  
 
but	 salient	 issues,	 announcing	 ‘deeper’	 cooperation	can	be	 a	way	to	 signal	 a	 long	 term	
commitment	to	liberal	trade	policies	and	economic	reform.		In	addition	to	international	
audiences,	 governments	 may	 also	 address	 domestic	 actors:	 Electorally	 accountable	




The	 study	 makes	 several	 contributions.	 Empirically,	 it	 is	 the	 first	 one	 to	 present	 a	
comprehensive	data	set	on	the	incorporation	of	1033	policies	Mercosur’s	then	four	mem-	
ber	 states	 Argentina,	 Brazil,	 Paraguay	 and	 Uruguay	 adopted	 between	 1994	 and	 2008.	
The	multivariate	analysis	 tests	 the	mostly	anecdotal	 claims	 from	the	mainly	 legal	liter-	




corporation	and	compliance	 in	 regional	 integration.	 Reflecting	 the	recently	heightened	
interest	 in	studying	regional	 integration	comparatively	 (Börzel	 	 and	 	Risse	 	2012;	 	Choi	and	










International	 cooperation	 is	 typically	 perceived	 as	 a	 chain	 of	 events:	 governments	 ne-	
gotiate,	 sign,	 incorporate,	 implement	and	 finally	comply	with	 international	agreements	
(Raustiala	 and	 Slaughter	 2003).	While	 signing	 a	 treaty	 expresses	 formal	commitment,	
this	 commitment	 is	 not	 immediately	 binding.	 Governments	 first	 need	 to	 actively	





and	 institutional	 changes	 into	 practice	 that	 are	 required	 to	 enact	 the	 international	
commitment	 at	 the	 domestic	 level.	 This	 comprises	 incorporation,	 but	 also	 all	 other	
necessary	 institutional	 adaptions	 (Raustiala	 and	 Slaughter	 2003).	 Finally,	 compliance	




Argentina,	 Brazil,	 Paraguay	 and	 Uruguay	 founded	 Mercosur	 in	 1991	 and	 installed	 its	





watch	 over	 the	 founding	 treaty	 of	 Asunción,	 to	 formulate	 policies	 furthering	 the	 economic	




the	 institutional	 hierarchy	 –	 which	 is	 already	 reflected	 by	 the	 rank	 of	 its	 mostly	
administrative	delegations.	The	Common	Market	Group	serves	as	the	main	policy	maker	in	
Mercosur	 and	 in	 practice	 decrees	 more	 than	 two	 thirds	 of	 all	 policies.	 The	 Trade	
Commission	is	specialised	on	trade	and	the	common	external	tariff.	
Each	country	incorporates	the	exact	wording	of	the	respective	agreement	into	domes-	
tic	 law	 and	 communicates	 successful	 incorporation	 to	 the	 Mercosur	 Secretariat.4	 The	
policies	are,	however,	not	immediately	binding:	They	enter	into	force	simultaneously	in	all	
member	 countries	 thirty	 days	 after	 the	 Secretariat	 has	 received	 notice	 of	 the	 last	
member’s	incorporation.	
Enforcement	mechanisms	are	key	 for	 the	strategic	dynamics	of	 international	politics	
(Keohane,	 Moravcsik	 and	 Slaughter.	 2000).	 Even	 if	 Mercosur’s	 formal	 institutions	 for	
enforcement	 developed	 to	 some	 extent	 regarding	 independence,	 access	 and	
embeddedness	 (Arnold	 and	 Rittberger	 2013),	 Mercosur’s	 member	 governments	 largely	
remain	 in	 control.	 Measured	 with	 the	 typology	 for	 dispute	 settlement	 systems	 from	
Yarbrough	and	Yarbrough	 (1997),	Mercosur	 files	 into	 the	 second	 weakest	 category.	 In	
terms	 of	 Keohane	 et	 al.	 (2000),	 Mercosur’s	 dispute	 settlement	 system	 displays	 a	
moderate	 level	 of	 legalization	 at	most	 (Arnold	 and	 Rittberger	2013;	Haftel	2013;	Lenz	
2012).	Most	importantly,	even	despite	moderate	formal	powers,	the	dispute	settlement	
mechanism	failed	to	develop	real	leverage	in	practice	(Caetano	2011;	Vinuesa	2004).	
Finally,	 Mercosur	 has	 a	 distinctive	 approach	 with	 regard	 to	 access	 to	 information	






















sign	 an	 agreement	 and	whether	 to	 follow	 up	 on	 it.	 Self-interested	 actors	 evaluate	 the	




Delegates	 may	 sign	 agreements	 to	 merely	 express	 their	 intention	 to	 cooperate.	 For	
example,	a	treaty	could	be	the	attempt	to	convince	a	domestic	constituency	about	a	general	
positive	 attitude	 towards	 international	 law	 (Dai	 2007;	 Marcoux	 and	 Urpelainen	 2013).	
International	commitment	can	also	serve	to	overcome	time-inconsistent	preferences,	be	it	to	
preempt	 state	 collapse	 and	 secure	 the	 peaceful	 settlement	 of	 conflicts	 (Moravcsik	 2000;	
Simmons	 and	 Danner	 2010),	 or	 economic	 prosperity	 (Milner	 and	 Büthe	 2009;	 Deere	
2009).66	
Incorporation	adds	 to	actors’	 cost-benefit	 calculations.	First,	delegates	expect	distributional	
consequences	 from	 putting	 a	 policy	 into	 practice.	 High	 adaption	 costs	 can	 make	 the	
implementation	of	international	rules	prohibitive	(Deere	2009).	Policy	out-	comes	may	even	
run	 counter	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 signatories	 (Marcoux	 and	 Urpelainen2013).	 For	 example,	
Hafner-Burton	and	Tsutsui	(2005)	point	to	the	fact	that	while	rogue	governments	benefit	from	
signing	 human	 rights	 treaties,	 they	 prefer	 these	 policies	 not	 to	 become	 effective.	 Second,	
governments	may	 fear	bad	 reputation	 from	 failing	 to	 follow	up	on	their	promise	(Carrubba	
2005;	Keohane	1984).	This	implicit	enforcement	fails,	however,	if	defection	can	go	unnoticed	
and	 interest	 groups	 do	 not	 hold	 sway	 over	 their	 governments	 (Dai	 2007;	 Hafner-Burton	 and	
Tsutsui	 2005;	 Marcoux	 and	 Urpelainen	 2013).	 Finally,	 dispute	 settlement	 mechanisms	 can	
impose	explicit	costs	via	sanctions	(Hafner-Burton	and	Tsutsui	2005;	Deere		2009).	
                                                        
6 Governments may even strategically use ratification – rather than signing an 





and	incorporating	 from	 three	 scenarios.	 First,	 if	signing	an	agreement	is	beneficial	and	
governments	expect	an	overall	positive	return	from	incorporating	the	policy,	they	cooper-	
ate	 in	both	stages.	They	adopt	a	policy	and	 incorporate	 it	 swiftly.	Second,	governments	
refrain	from	even	signing	an	agreement,	if	there	is	little	to	gain	from	the	signature	alone	
and	 if	 incorporation	 is	 expected	 to	 have	 negative	 consequences.	 Finally,	 governments	










In	 practice,	 empty	 promises	 are	 possible,	 because	 the	 addressees	 of	 the	 government’s	
message	 are	 often	miopic.	 Given	 the	 complexity	 of	 international	 trade	 policies,	 audiences	
have	a	limited	attention	span.	The	promise	to	cooperate	and	the	actual	change	in	conduct	are	
often	 perceived	 as	 two	 unrelated	 events	 instead	 of	 a	 single	 one	 made	 up	 of	 two	 stages.	
Audiences	 focus	 on	 governments’	 immediate	 claims	 rather	 than	 evaluating	 promises	on	a	
more	encompassing	level.	 For	example,	in	times	of	economic	crisis,	inter-	 national	markets	
react	 immediately	 when	 governments	 announce	 new	 trade	 policies	 and	 not	 when	 they	
implement	them.	Magee,	Brock	and	Young	(1989)	argue	that	under	such	conditions	voters	
accept	ambiguous	signals	and	end	up	rewarding	even	policy	platforms	that	are	against	their	
interest.	 Recent	 empirical	work	 stresses	 that	 democratic	 governments	 can	 exploit	 voters’	
incapacity	strategically	 (Kono	2006).	Governments	negotiate	and	adopt	 trade	policies	 that	












successfully	 incorporate	after	a	 short	period	of	 time.	 In	contrast,	 if	 a	policy	offers	 little	







market	 friendly	 economic	policy	making.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 they	 try	 to	 evade	
the	 implementation	 of	 and	 compliance	 to	 costly	 policies.	 	 In	 Latin	 America,	 regional	










However,	 in	 Mercosur	 these	 kind	 of	 promises	 are	 particularly	 unlikely	 to	 be	 kept.	 While	
adopting	 these	 policies	 sends	 a	 clear	message	 about	 the	 intention	 to	 cooperate	 in	 the	 first	
instance,	 they	 will	 cause	 considerable	 adaption	 costs	 when	 eventually	 put	 into	 practice.	




Explicit	 enforcement	 of	 agreements	 involve	 diplomatic	 costs,	 which	 is	 why	 in	 practice	
                                                        






the	 survival	 of	 the	 regional	 integration	 project	 by	 jointly	 adopting	 policies	 that	 ‘deepen’	













Barahona	de	Brito	 2005).	 The	more	 popular	 regional	 cooperation,	 the	more	 eager	 are	
politicians	to	make	use	of	the	diplomatic	stage.	Governments	again	turn	to	contracts	that	
diversify	 or	 centralise	 the	 regional	 polity,	 because	 it	 portrays	 them	 as	 proactive	 and	
cosmopolitan	 leaders.	
Once	 more,	 Mercosur’s	 low	 implicit	 and	 explicit	 sanctioning	 capabilities	 allow	
politicians	 to	 easily	 suspend	 incorporation	 in	 the	 foresight	 of	 costly	 political	
consequences.	 Politicians	 sign-off	 regional	 policies	 that	 promise	 ‘deeper’	 cooperation,	
knowing	that	they	can	easily	veto	ex-post.	
Not	all	delegates,	however,	follow	this	logic.	Only	democratically	accountable	decision-	
makers	 who	 care	 for	 popular	 support	 engage	 in	 this	 kind	 of	 window	 dressing.	 In	
Mercosur,	while	political	leaders	convene	in	the	Common	Market	Council,	the	other	two	
decision	 bodies	 are	 made	 up	 of	 administrative	 ranks.	 Domestic	 preferences	 tempt	
politicians	 from	 the	 Common	 Market	 Council	 to	 make	 empty	 promises,	 but	
administrators	 from	 the	 Common	 Market	 Group	 and	 the	 Trade	 Commission	 remain	
                                                        
8 For the effect of an increase in intraregional conflict on the adoption of policies 











H2:	 When	 Mercosur’s	 popularity	 is	 high,	 elected	 politicians	 in	 the	 Common	 Market	
Council	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 make	 empty	 promises	 than	 at	 low	 levels	 of	 popularity.	 In	







backgrounds	 criticise	 Mercosur’s	 limited	 regulatory	 capacities.	 Even	 though	 this	
literature	 only	 rarely	 refers	 to	 other	 empirical	 cases	 of	 international	 cooperation,	 its	
arguments	are	often	quite	 similar	 and	 can	be	 structured	along	 the	 lines	of	 established	




keep	 the	 promises	 from	 the	 negotiation	 table.	 International	 negotiations	 require	





up	 on	 the	 incorporation	 of	 regulations	 they	 draft	 themselves	 (Gonzáles	 Garabelli	 2004).	





Given	 scarce	 administrative	 resources,	 decision	 bodies	 are	 dramatically	 overcharged		
(Peña	 	 2003;	 	 Ventura	 and	 	 Perotti	 2004;	 	 Zalduendo	 	 1998).	 	 	 Mercosur’s	 agreements	
therefore	 often	 lack	 the	 sufficient	 level	 of	 technical	 and	 juridical	 scrutiny.	 In	 return,	 if	




that	 define	many	 comprehensive	 changes	 to	 a	 status	quo	 are	more	 likely	 to	 be	 error	
prone.	Any	obstacles	during	the	incorporation	process	immediately	translate	into	longer	
and	more	exhaustive	incorporation	processes.	 The	less	complex	a	policy	the	more	 likely	
swift	 incorporation.	 In	 the	 European	 Union,	 the	 complexity	 of	 a	 directive	 delays	
transposition	 in	 an	 important	 way	 (Haverland	 and	 Romeijn	 2007;	 Kaeding	 2006;	
Zhelyazkova		2013).	
Insufficient	 coordination	 among	 Mercosur’s	 delegations	 and	 domestic	 counterparts	
contributes	to	policy	incompatibility.	Delegates	often	fail	to	recognise	administrative,	legal	
or	 constitutional	 realities	 of	 member	 states,	 causing	 technical	 and	 juridical	 problems	
(Bouzas	and	Soltz	2001a;	Bouzas	et	al.	2008;	Geneyro	2003).	Domestic	actors	responsible	
for	incorporation	such	as	national	ministries	(Peña	2003)	or	parliaments	(Perotti	et	al.	2004;	
Ventura	and	Perotti	2004)	 therefore	need	 to	mitigate	ex-post.	 The	 number	 of	 relevant	
domestic	actors	delegations	need	to	consult	when	drafting	a	policy	drive	the	transaction	





more	 often	 do	 governments	 alter	 existing	 Mercosur	 rules	 already	 adopted	 before.	
Studies	on	the	European	Union	have	found	different	effects	from	amending	rather	than	
newly	regulating	issues.	Some	argue	that	amendments	mostly	refine	existing	policies	and	
are	incorporated	swiftly	(Borghetto,	 Franchino	 and	 Gianetti	2006;	Mastenbroek	2003).	
Others	challenge	this	view	and	contend	that	re-adjusting	policies	enforces	actors	to	change	
established	routines	 and	 behaviour,	 causing	 higher	 transaction	 costs	 and	 in	 consequence	
more	comprehensive	incorporation	processes	(Falkner,	Treib,	Hartlapp	and	Leiber	2005).	





Finally,	 some	 refer	 to	 the	 constitutions’	 legal	 traditions	 and	 the	 way	 in	 which	 they	
relate	domestic	to	 international	 law	(Bergamaschine	Mata	Diz	2005;	Nascimento	2004;	
Pena	 and	Rozemberg	2005).	 In	monist	 constitutions,	 international	 law	has	precedence	
over	 domestic	 law.	 Dualist	 constitutions,	 in	 contrast,	 posit	 that	 international	 and	
domestic	law	are	two	distinct	spheres.	Since	international	law	is	between	states	and	not	
between	 individuals,	 it	 is	 less	 powerful	 than	 domestic	 law.	 The	 legal	 procedures	 for	





same	 time,	 the	powerful	 states	use	 the	 regional	block	 to	project	power	 (De	Lima	and	Hirst	
2006;	 Spektor	 2010)	 and	 consolidate	 their	 regional	 leadership	 (Eichengreen	and	Frankel	
1995;	Malamud	2011;	Vigevani,	 Favoron,	 Ramanzini	 and	 Correia	2008).	Member	states’	
bargaining	 power	stems	from	the	strong	asymmetry	 in	the	 levels	of	 intraregional	trade	
interdependence	 (Gómez-Mera	 2013).	 Ultimately,	 the	 economies	 of	 Paraguay	 and	Uruguay	
are	in	relative	terms	much	more	involved	with	its	Mercosur	partners	than	the	economies	
from	 Argentina	 and	 Brazil.	 Those	 who	 depend	 little	 on	 intraregional	 trade	can	rather	
easily	 cooperate	 with	 countries	 outside	 the	 regional	 block.	 Argentina	 and	 Brazil	 are	




Bargaining	 power,	 however,	 does	 not	 stem	 from	 trade	 interdependence,	 only.	 Chairing	 international	
summits	 has	 been	 found	 to	 be	 yet	 another	 important	 way	 to	 influence	 the	 outcome	 of	 negotiations	
(Tallberg	2006,	2010).	The	power	 from	chairs	derives	 from	 their	 informational	 advantages.	They	are	 in	
close	contact	with	all	delegations	and	gain	insights	into	the	real	bargaining	position	of	other	parties.	They	
also	 set	 the	 agenda,	structure	negotiations,	administer	voting	and	summarise	results.	 Due	to	Mercosur’s	
strong	intergovernmental	character	with	a	rotating	presidency	hosting	all	Mercosur	meetings	during	this	6-
month	period,	chairs	should	have	a	particularly	distinct	influence	on	negotiation	results	(Tallberg	2010).	If	a	






























                                                        
10 In general, international agreements may foresee different rules as to when exactly policies 
become legally binding. In some cases – like the European Union – a member government who 
incorporates a directive suffices to trigger immediate validity in this particular country. In other 
cases, policies take effect  only  after a previously  agreed  threshold has been  reached.   For 
example, the Kyoto Protocol foresees in its Art.25 that at least 55 states that also account for at least
55% of CO2 emissions need to deposit their instruments of ratification. In the extreme case, like in 
Mercosur, all countries need to legally commit before a policy enters into force in all signatory 
states. These incorporation rules have important consequences for the strategic character of 
international cooperation. The respective quora determine when domestic courts can enforce 
international law and when exactly signatory states jointly produce collective goods (Frohlich and 
Oppenheimer 1970; Schelling 1973). 
11 Not all of Mercosur’s policies have to be incorporated by all four members, which is why the 














successfully	 incorporated	 regulations	 as	 measured	 in	 each	 year.	 Incorporation	 initially	
plummeted	in	1996,	but	has	been	increasing	ever	since	and	reaches	a	level	between	63.0%	in	















the	 values	 is	 right	 skewed,	 with	 extreme	 values	 beyond	 the	 range	 of	 1.5	 times	 the	
interquartile	range.	While	the	majority	of	the	policies	is	incorporated	swiftly,	some	of	the	




                                                        
12 In contrast to other regional organisations (see Hartlapp and Falkner 2009), successful 
incorporation and its timing can be exactly identified for 92.95% of all cases. Usually, Mercosur’s 
members use one legal instrument for incorporation. Since 2002, decision CMC 20/02 obliges the 
members to use only one single domestic legal instrument. Governments occasionally made use of 












cooperation	 in	 the	 electorate.	 	 Gómez-Mera	 (2008,	 	 2013)	 measures	 the	 perceived	 level	 of	
conflict	 among	 member	 states	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 media	 coverage.	 She	 devises	 a	 yearly,	
aggregate	 index	 that	 takes	 on	 average	 3.39	 and	 varies	with	 a	 standard	 deviation	 of	




cooperation.	 On	 average,	 81.26%	 of	 the	 population	 (standard	 deviation	 6.57)	 are	not	
against	regional	economic	cooperation.	
Further	 variables	 address	 the	 respective	 observable	 implications	 from	 alternative	
explanations.	Mercosur’s	 policies	may	 carry	 an	 appendix	with	 technical	 or	 regulatory	
details.	 Policies	featuring	such	a	document	are	more	likely	to	be	the	result	of	 elaborate	
preparation.	 On	 average,	 technical	 appendices	 indicate	 that	 delegates	 were	 more	
attentive	when	drafting	a	policy.	 In	Mercosur,	60.68%	of	all	polices	carry	such	an	annex.	















                                                        
13 Please see online appendix for the recoding of the respective  questions. 
14 Both values are log transformed to account for their skewed distributions. 
15 The principal component score was calculated using all Mercosur regulations–


























already	 existing	 legislation.	 In	 Mercosur,	 14.88%	 of	 all	 policies	 fall	 into	 this	 category.	
Bargaining	power	allows	to	realise	the	own	interest	and	secure	more	favourable	terms	in	
international	negotiations.	Since	Mercosur’s	policies	do	not	always	concern	all	countries,	
Argentina	has	 to	 incorporate	 870	Mercosur	policies,	 Brazil	 882	policies,	 Paraguay	929	
policies	and	Uruguay	879	policies.	Second,	Mercosur’s	members	share	the	presidency	on	a	
rotating,	 6-months	 based	 scheme.	 A	 dummy	 identifies	 those	 policies	 a	 country	 signs	
















time	 a	 government	 takes	 to	 do	 so.	 The	 unit	 of	 analysis	 –	 here	 a	Mercosur	 policy	 in	a	
member	 country	 –	 enters	 the	 observation	 period	with	 the	 status	 as	 non-incorporated	
policy	 and	 alters	 this	 discrete	 state	 after	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 time.	 Depending	 on	
covariates,	 the	 probability	 that	 incorporation	 occurs	may	be	 high	 at	 earlier	 or	 at	 later	
stages	 (Box-Steffensmeier	 and	 Jones	 1997;	 Johnson	 and	 Albert	 1999):	 While	
incorporation	is	likely	to	be	swift	in	the	first	case,	it	will	be	rather	slow	in	the	second.	A	
Weibull	 distribution	 parameterises	 the	 baseline	 probability	 that	 an	 event	 occurs	 given	
that	it	has	not	taken	place	yet.16	Table	2	presents	regression	results	from	the	multivariate	
hazard	rate	model	(n	=	3560).	 As	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	further	below,	results	
indicate	 that	 in	 addition	 to	management	 failures	 and	 the	 abuse	 of	 negotiation	 power,	
empty	promises	are	an	important	impediment	to	incorporation	in	Mercosur.	
The	main	variables	of	interest	are	in	line	with	theoretical	expectations.		The	level			of	




Similarly,	 public	 support	 for	Mercosur	 is	 not	 systematically	 related	 to	 the	 expected	
time	 necessary	 to	 incorporate.	 But	 Mercosur’s	 decision	 bodies	 make	 an	 important	
difference.	When	 the	 Common	Market	 Council	 adopts	 a	 policy,	 higher	 levels	 of	 public	
support	for	Mercosur	lead	to	longer	incorporation	in	comparison	to	those	adopted	in	the	
Common	Market	Group.	 In	 contrast,	when	 the	Trade	Commission	adopts	policies,	 high	
                                                        
16 The distribution assumes proportional effects from the covariates on the baseline 
rate. I examine this assumption for a Cox-model with the Therneau-Grambsch test 
(see Grambsch and Therneau 1994). The global test reports its violation for all 
variables. The standard remedy would be interactions with some transformation of 
time (Keele 2010; Licht 2011).  It does not mitigate the problem in any of the cases. 
Further robustness checks with specifications that do not require either 
assumptions lead to similar results in magnitude and error margin. In addition, 
from a theoretical perspective, a monotonic duration dependence is a plausible way 
to think about the incorporation process. The Weibull distribution therefore seems 












the	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 estimate	 is	 slightly	 too	 large	 to	 report	 an	 effect	 on	 a	
conventionally	 accepted	 confidence	 level.	 	 Policies	 that	 explicitly	 refer	 to	 existing			
legislation	lead	to	expect	more	time	for	incorporation	at	a	statistically	significant	level.	
Preference	 related	 factors	 also	 affect	 incorporation	 in	 Mercosur.	 Regarding	 the	
bargaining	 	 power	 of	 the	 member	 countries,	 Brazil,	 followed	 by	 Argentina	 and	 then	
Paraguay,	 all	 incorporate	more	swiftly	 than	Uruguay.	 A	member	country	 that	holds	 the	









Table	2	 Estimation	 results	 from	 survival	model	 (Weibull	Distribution).	 The	 reference	

















































All	 other	 categories	 require	 more	 time.	 With	 the	 exception	 of	 policies	 regulating	










member	state	governments	are	reluctant	 to	 incorporate	 them.	Figure	3(a)	displays	 the	
effect	 from	 regional	 crises	 on	 incorporation.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 estimated	 regression	
equation,	I	simulate	the	expected	time	for	incorporation	at	different	conflict	levels	(King,	








The	 reason	 for	 this	 behaviour	 are	 empty	 promises.	 At	 first,	 governments	 easily	
contract	 over	 future	 cooperation	 during	 times	 of	 conflict,	 because	 they	 benefit	 from	
displaying	commitment	to	the	regional	agreement.	But	while	Mercosur’s	members	make	
promises	 about	 ‘deeper’	 cooperation,	 they	 do	 not	 necessarily	 intend	 to	 keep	 them.	
Incorporation	of	and	later	compliance	to	these	agreements	is	costly.	Governments	prefer	
not	to	put	the	terms	of	the	agreements	into	legal	practice.	And	given	they	do	not	have	to	







disputes	 between	 1999	 and	 2002,	 leading	 Mercosur’s	 members	 to	 engage	 in	 fierce	
debates	over	the	trade	of	chicken,	car	tires	and	sugar,	amongst	others.	Politicians	needed	
to	cater	for	these	concerns	out	of	electoral	considerations	and	had	to	protect	important	
domestic	 interest	 groups.	 Despite	 of	 these	 conflicts,	 however,	 governments	 ensured	
other	 international	 partners	 and	 investors	 that	 they	 still	 intended	 to	 continue	 regional	
cooperation	 and	 adhere	 to	market	 friendly	 economic	 policies	 (Gómez-Mera	 2009,	 2013).	 In	
consequence,	Mercosur’s	member	governments	initiated	a	prominent	campaign	to	relaunch	
the	regional	integration	project	(el	Relanzamiento	del	Mercosur	),	contracting	over	a	broad	
array	 of	 institutional	 innovations	 and	 further	 governmental	 cooperation.This	 relaunch,	
however,	never	lived	up	to	solemn	vows	on	paper	(Bouzas	2001;	Gómez-	Mera	2013;	Malamud	
2005).	
Empty	 promises	 also	 occur	 when	 politicians	 are	 eager	 to	 impress	 their	 electorate.	





citizens’	 support	 of	 regional	 economic	 cooperation	 –	 from	 a	 comparably	 low	 level	 at	
70.4%	 (2.5%	 quantile)	 to	 a	 high	 level	 at	 89.8%	 (97.5%	 quantile).	 I	 then	 calculate	 the	






for	 incorporation.	 In	 contrast,	 public	 opinion	 takes	 virtually	 no	 substantive	 effect	 if	
bureaucrats	sign	such	policies.	
This	at	first	sight	counterintuitive	result	–	the	more	in	favour	the	population	towards	
regional	 cooperation,	 the	 longer	 it	 takes	 to	 enact	 regional	 policies	 domestically	 –	 is	 a	
consequence	 from	 empty	 promises.	 Politicians	 contract	 for	 matters	 of	 a	 positive	 and	
proactive	image.	At	the	same	time,	they	make	use	of	voter’s	limited	capacity	to	follow	up	
on	 the	 details	 of	 international	 trade	 governance	 (Kono	 2006;	 Magee,	 Brock	 and	 Young	
  
 




challenge	 the	 swift	 and	 correct	 incorporation	 of	 Mercosur	 policies.	 The	 slow	
incorporation	 of	 policies	 without	 a	 technical	 annex	 indicates	 that	 a	 more	 thorough	
preparation	 does	 indeed	 reduce	 obstacles	 during	 the	 incorporation	 process.	 More	
complex	 policies	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 contradict	 existing	 legislation.	 Similarly,	 member	
governments	require	 more	time	to	incorporate	those	policies	that	explicitly	change	the	
status	 quo.	 More	 veto	 players	 increase	 the	 necessary	 coordination	 of	 interests	 when	




partners’	 interest.	 Similarly,	more	economically	 independent	member	countries	 find	 it	
more	easy	 to	realise	 their	policy	goals.	 The	swift	 incorporation	of	exceptions	 from	 the	
Common	External	Tariff	fits	into	the	picture.	These	policies	are	the	government’s	attempt	to	
appease	 interest	groups	(Gómez-Mera	2005)	and	serve	governments	 to	 increase	the	political	
viability	of	the	regional	cooperation	scheme	(Olarreaga	1998).	Since	incorporating	these	
agreements	 is	 highly	 beneficial,	 it	 is	 no	 surprise	 that	 this	 group	 of	 policies	 finds	 the	
immediate	attention	of	governments.	In	addition,	incentives	for	free-riding	do	not	seem	to	
cause	Mercosur’s	incorporation	issues.	If	motives	for	free-riding	exist,	we	would	observe	
much	 longer	 durations	 for	 policies	 regulating	 the	 common	 external	 tariff.	 Bargaining	
strength	 therefore	makes	much	more	of	a	difference	 to	 subsequent	 incorporation	 than	
fundamental	differences	in	member’s	institutional	context	such	as	the	legal	 traditions	of	










Mercosur’s	 founding	members	Argentina,	 Brazil,	 Paraguay	 and	Uruguay	 adopted	1033	
regulations	 between	 1994	 and	 2008,	 but	 incorporated	 only	 about	 two	 thirds	 of	 them.	
Analysing	 this	 data	 with	 a	 multivariate	 hazard	 rate	 model,	 this	 study	 shows	 that	
Mercosur’s	 incorporation	 problem	 has	multiple	 causes.	 Empty	 promises	 constitute	 an	
important	 stumbling	 block	 to	 incorporation	 in	 Mercosur.	 In	 addition,	 managerial	
problems,	 but	 also	 the	 abuse	 of	 negotiation	 power	 cause	 longer	 or	 even	 vetoed	
incorporation	processes.		Free-riding	does	not	affect	incorporation.	
The	study	makes	several	contributions.	 In	analysing	Mercosur’s	complete	incorporation	
record	 of	 all	 policies	 adopted	 between	 1994	 and	 2008,	 it	 offers	 comprehensive	 and	
empirically	 grounded	 insights	 into	 the	 determinants	 of	 incorporation	 behaviour	 in	
Mercosur.	Focussing	on	the	consequences	from	its	institutional	design,	this	study	adds	to	
the	understanding	of	Mercosur’s	rules	for	incorporation	(Bouzas	et	al.	2008),	the	effects	
from	 its	 intergovernmental	 enforcement	mechanisms	 and	 low	 levels	 of	 information	about	
the	status	quo	of	incorporation	(Perotti	2002;	Zalduendo	1998).	
Moreover,	the	paper	adds	empty	promises	as	an	important	mechanism	to	explain	non-	
incorporation	 in	 regional	 integration,	 thus	offering	valuable	 insights	 to	an	 increasingly	
comparative	 literature	 (Börzel	 and	 Risse	 2012;	 Gray	 2014;	 Malamud	 2010).	 The	 paper	
furthers	 the	 understanding	 of	 how	 institutions	 affect	 international	 cooperation.	 When	
governments	do	not	need	to	 fear	consequences	 from	non-compliance,	 signatures	alone	
may	be	reason	enough	for	contracting.	Empty	promises	(Deere	2009;	Hafner-Burton	and	
















??? Governments	 use	 signing	 to	 signal	
sustained	 interest	 in	 regional	
cooperation	 despite	 high	 levels	 of	
conflict,	 but	 seek	 to	 avoid	 the	 high	
adaption	 costs	 from	 policies	 on	
governmental	 cooperation.	How	much	
incorporation	 delay	 if	 the	 level	 of	
regional	 conflict	 raises	 from	 0	 (2.5%	
quantile)	 to	 18.5	 (97.5%	 quantile)?	
Expected	 difference	 in	 incorporation	
duration	 for	 governmental	
cooperation	 on	 the	 left	 and	 all	 other	
policies	 on	 the	 right.	 Conflict	 level	 as	
measured	by	Gómez-Mera	(2013).	
??? Politicians	in	the	CMC	use	signing	to	
create	 a	 positive	 image	 among	 their	
electorate,	 but	 seek	 to	 avoid	 the	 high	




(2.5%	 quantile)	 to	 89.8%	 (97.5%	
quantile)?	 Expected	 difference	 in	
incorporation	 duration	 for	 policies	 on	
governmental	 cooperation	 for	 the	 CMC	
on	the	left	and	the	CMG	and	TC	on	the	
right.	 Popularity	 as	 measured	 by	 the	
Latinobarómetro.	
	
Figure	 3	 Governments	 easily	 adopt	 policies	 that	 offer	 benefits	 from	
merely	signing	them,	but	seek	to	avoid	those	that	are	costly	to	
incorporate.	 These	 empty	 promises	 cause	 systematically	
delayed	 incorporation.	 	Results	 from	simulations	with	all	other	
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